The Treaty of London and Italy’s National Aspirations

By Dr. Attilio Tamaro

(Translated from the Bulletin of the Royal Italian Geographical Society May–June 1918).
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After the many comments made upon the Treaty of London, before it was known, let us try to make a few, taking the text as given in the edition of the "Izvestia" of Petrograd and of the "New Europe" of London, which the Honorable Bevione read before the Italian Chamber of Deputies. That the text of the Treaty of London published by the Bolsheviki has been changed in various ways from the original is evident from at least two facts: (a) From the inexactness of its geographical indications, an inexactness which is inadmissible in a treaty of such great importance. (b) From the persistence with which are omitted the details which prove the latitude and importance of the concessions made to the Croatians and to the Serbs.

Here, for instance, is one of these omissions: The quoted text of the Treaty of London counts among the concessions made to the Croatians on the coast of Quarnaro only the ports of Novi and Carlo-pago, and calls them "small," but neglects to mention the larger ones, namely, those of Buccari, Segna and Cirquenizza.

Since for the present there is no other text, we shall have to abide by the one disclosed at Petrograd, at the same time recognizing the changes made for the benefit of the Slavs. We wish, however, to confine ourselves only to what concerns Italian aspirations, the vindication of Italy’s title to those lands which are by nationality, by geography, by history and by right, Italian.

If we make note of errors and incongruities, it must not be believed that it is our intention to criticize the government which drew up the treaty. This did not proceed, as it stands, from the sole will of Italy. It represents a curtailment of the original claims of the Italian government. It is the result of compromises from which Italy could not withdraw. The responsibility and the errors of the
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Government would commence if the terms of the Treaty of London were considered as a MAXIMUM, and not as in truth they are, as a MINIMUM.

The terms of the Treaty are purely defensive. They propose, as a fundamental principle of Italian safety and European peace, the establishment of boundaries that shall restore the unity of Italy as a nation, and defend her existence as a state, in the face of those races which press against her on the North and on the East through fatal and inevitable historical laws. Is the settlement requested such as to secure peace to Italy? Is it such as to permit Italy to work peacefully within a series of bulwarks on land and sea, fit to command the respect of peoples eager for war and conquest? Her geographical position has exposed Italy for centuries to the usurpations of three empires: the German, the Hungarian and the Slav. A peace to be really founded on a stable basis should defend Italy against any incursion from the three empires which in more recent times have united to form Austria-Hungary. Before this monarchy existed, these three empires had moved separately against Italy. As Valussi showed as far back as 1871, the destruction of Austria would break the centralizing organ of those three national powers, but it would not arrest at all the very strong, instinctive traditional tendencies of the Germans, Magyars and Slavs to reach an outlet to the Adriatic between Trieste and Fiume at the expense of Italy. The treaty of peace, if it is to be such, and not an act of truce, must defend a nationally reintegrated Italy against these tendencies.

What advantages does the treaty of London secure to Italy, and what sacrifices does it cost her? This is what we shall try to find out. When we will show the very great advantages assured to the Slavs it must not be suspected that we entertain any idea of taking all of these away from them and of restoring to credit the theory of "the outlet to the sea." Already in 1915 we wrote that to the Southern Slavs not only an outlet but also a wide coast must be assigned. Although the serious accentuation of Jugo-Slavic imperialism which is a product of the war should make us very cautious in favoring its expansion, let us not today consider solutions less generous than those proposed early in 1915, when only songs of victory were in the air. We shall note the advantages secured to the Southern Slavs because some of these constitute most cruel self-mutilation on the part of Italy, and because others prove what foundations for power the Slavs can derive from these advantages.
Trentino and Upper Adige

The paragraph giving the boundaries to which Italy has the right against the Germans in the North, within her natural geographical frontiers and in such manner as to realize her complete unity, appears to be outlined in these terms: "The frontier line shall be drawn along the following points, from the summit of the Umbrile towards the north to the Stelvio, then along the watershed of the Alpi Retiche as far as the sources of the rivers Adige and Eisach, thence across Mts. Reschen and Brennero and the peaks Etz and Ziller. The frontier then inclines southward, touching Mt. Toblach thus reaching the existing frontier of the Carniola which is in the Alps."

Ettore Tolomei has shown the insidiousness of all the German names which seem to hide the historical and national truth. He has corrected the text in the following manner:

"The frontier line shall be drawn along the following points, from the summit of the Ombraglio towards the North to the Stelvio, then along the watershed of the Alpi Retiche as far as the sources of the rivers Adige and Isarco, then across Mts. Resia and Brennero and the peaks of the Alpi Venoste and Auriche. The frontiers then incline from the Vetta d' Italia, along the peaks of the Alpi Pusteresi across the pass of Dobiaco, reaching at Monte Paterno the existing Venetian frontier in the Alpi Carniche."

On the Italian side of this line remains Venezia Tridentina, made up of the Trentino, the center of which is Trento, and of the Upper Adige, the center of which is Bolzano. It is the line of the watershed between the basin of the Danube and that of the Adriatic. Italy tends to establish all her frontier upon this divide. It must not be believed that this theory is an invention of ours, made in the service of our policy. It has its source in oldest times. The "Divertiga Aquarium" determined the frontiers as far back as in the days of Rome. Since then it has been a law. Two Venetian commissioners discussing in 1577 a boundary question asserted that "in the divide of the waters is manifestly to be recognized the true division of Italy from Germany." In 1810 the government of the Viceroy Eugene determined that the best boundary for Italy is "La limite tracée par nature même sur le sommet des montagnes où se separent les eux de la Mer Noire et celles de l'Adriatique." Italy maintains today this immutable principle for her national and geographical confines. Therefore Italy demands from the Germans the frontier of the Brennero, on this side.
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of which are 420,000 Italians and 180,000 Germans who have filtered in along the valleys.

The frontier of the Brennero is also a powerful military defense. Hitherto, to use the words of Correnti, Italy has been in the ditches and the Germans on the walls. We must be free from this subjection. Penck has recently written that Austria and, from the side of Venetian Trento, Germany have made for themselves a boundary which is a "wall against which even the most courageous army must dash itself to death." Italy has never invaded German territory, while the Germans have done untold injuries to Italy. Italy must defend herself. She must build herself a formidable wall against which even the most obstinate German army will hurl itself in vain. The Treaty of London forecasts, as a right, the establishment of such a wall which shall be formed at the North of the Alpi Venoste, Passirie, Breonie, Aurine, Pusteresi and Carniche. Beside the impassable mass of their mountain ridges, they offer another advantage, namely, the Trentino allows the army which occupies it to empty itself into the plains or the foothills of Italy through more than twenty gates. The natural frontier of Italy, on the other hand, opens to the North through only three gates (the pass of Resia, the pass of the Brennero and the pass of Dobbiaco) along a line which is half as long as that of the existing political boundary.

Julian Region

In determining the Northeastern boundary from the Alpi Carniche to the end of the Alpi Giulie, the Treaty of London follows the principle formulated for the Venetian Trentino: the divide between the waters of the Adriatic and those of the Danube. As a matter of fact, the terms of the Treaty are the final confirmation of a truth which our armies will realize and in support of which the historian can quote a universal consent unchallenged for two thousand years: the truth that the Alpi Giulie form the northeastern frontier of Italy. The paragraph relative to the Venezia Giulia says:

"Along the frontier of the Alps the line shall touch Mount Tarvis and shall follow the watershed of the Alpi Giulie beyond the crests of Predil, Mangart and Tricorno, and the passes of Poderbo, Podlansko and Idria.

"From here the line will turn in a southeasterly direction towards the Schneeberg in such a way as not to include in the Italian terri-
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tory the basin of the Sava and of its tributaries. From the Schnee­berg the frontier shall descend toward the coast, including Castua, Mattuglia and Volosca as Italian districts.”

In this text, there are also some toponymical changes to be made. The pass of Toblansco is better known under the name of the Pass of Circhina. The Schneeberg is the classic Mount Albio or Monte Nevoso, considered from time immemorial a boundary of Italy.

The indications of the paragraph are exact as far as the name of Idria, then they are too vague and it is probable that there is here an alteration of the original text in order to leave ambiguous a point vital to Italian interest. For the line from Idria and Monte Nevoso is precisely the most debated one, since there is doubt as to which of three lines, which we shall show, be the most opportune and the most natural for the Italian frontier.

The text of the Treaty speaks of a Mount Tarvis. A mountain of that name does not exist. It might be taken to mean the Pass of Tarvis, but this does not really exist. Therefore one must infer that the reference is to the Sella di Camporosso, a famous watershed to the West of Tarvis. From the relative indications of the Treaty one sees that the Italian Government, holding scrupulously to the principle of the divide of the waters, has not redeemed the zone of Tarvis, which, as a military necessity, belonged to the kingdom of Italy of the Napoleonic era (1806-1813). The place is in a formidable position. It is the key which holds open the gates of three paths: that of the Tagliamento, across the Sella di Camporosso and the Valfella; that of the Isonzo across the Predil; that of the Sava, across the Sella di Ratschach.

The boundary line recognized in the Treaty insures to Italy a mighty bulwark. Today all Friuli lies open. All the gateways to Italy are in the hands of the enemy. We must climb, defend the mountain peaks, fortify our natural frontier, close the gates which have been open for too many centuries. Out of hundreds of barbarian invasions that Italy has suffered, there are not ten which have not come through these gates. Slavs, Germans, Magyars and Turks came from beyond the passes of the Julian Alps. The troops of Radetsky came thru that way. The troops of Below and Boroevic held them in their hands and used them at the opportune moment. The Treaty of London recognizes Italy’s right to do what she has striven in vain.
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to accomplish for centuries: to control the entrance to her territory. The Treaty also contemplates the restoration to Italy of the districts of Idria and Vipacco now annexed to Carniola. The district of Vipacco was annexed in the XVI century. The Austrian geographer, Gras­selli, recognized in 1782 that it belonged to Italy. "Ad Carniola hodie refertur," he stated, "sed in Italia iacet." In 1783 the district of Idria was torn from the Friuli, to which it had always belonged. It lies on this side of the watershed, within the natural boundaries.

After Idria, the indications, as we said, are general and inexact. All the Valley of the Frigido is certainly comprised in the provisions of the Treaty, therefore, beyond the Forest of Tarnova; also that of Pero, above which is the pass by the same name—"the usual route of the barbarians," as Giambullari wrote. Between the forest of Pero and Monte Nevoso, both geographers and statesmen, from time immemorial, have disagreed. Some have proposed the line running through and including the pass of Longatico; others, like Porena, indicated the line running through the pass of Postumia or Postogna; yet others, like Marinelli, the line that runs through the pass of Prevaldo. These three passes form one complex gateway, called from ancient tradition, the Porta d'Italia. Where does the line fixed by the Treaty of London run? In the published text it appears that only the tributaries of the Sava are excluded. But just in the zone between Prevaldo and Longatico, between the basin of the upper Timavo and that of the Lubiana, there run two streams which rise and are lost in the Carso, giving no indication of what water course they are tributary. It seems established that the stream Piuca near Postogna is not a tributary of the Sava. Apparently the same may be said of the Uncia near Longatico. Giovanni Marinelli admitted that the Piuca flows into the Sava, while Porena believed this true only of the Uncia. A scientific proof of the course of the two streams, as far as we know, does not exist. These are problems of the Carso regarding which no decisive experiments have been made. Nor is the line of the Adriatic-Danubian watershed known with apodictical certainty. Such questions are not resolved in the text of the Treaty published by the Bolsheviki, but it is unbelievable that precise indications were not given in the original text. It could not have accepted the line of Prevaldo (Monte Re, Monte Auremiano, Monte Nevoso) because that would have established the frontier of Italy at less than twenty kilometers from Trieste. It is probable, considering the moderate tone of the entire treaty, that it determines the boundary of Italy along the limits of the political district of Postina, the forest of Piro; Monte Sernago, 916 meters high; Monte San Lorenzo, 1019 meters high;
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Monte Volei, 929 meters high; Monte Iavornig, 1268 meters high, and Monte Nevoso. That would be about 40 kilometers from Trieste and the sea. It would correspond just about to the limits of the third arc of the Southern Julian Alps, designated by Porena as the boundaries of Italy. With the long range guns of today it cannot be said that this line represents the ideal of safety. Nevertheless it is a good line and probably that of the water divide.

National Economic and Military Questions

POLA.—The Treaty of London assigns to Italy all eastern Friuli and most of Istria. It sanctions Italy’s national right to the cities of Gorizia, Trieste and Pola and other minor centers where the struggle in the name of Italy has been no less ardent. Words are not adequate to express the greatness and the sanctity of the rights upheld by the Treaty. It secures national liberty to Trieste, but at the same time deals her a heavy economic blow in placing her against Fiume by separating the latter from Italy. Not for themselves will the people of Trieste suffer, but for their brothers left in subjection to their hereditary enemy, if the Treaty proves to be the same as it has been published. In this connection we recall a great popular demonstration during which an orator was wildly applauded who had said, “Trieste had better become a nest of fishermen, rather than flourish under the barbarians.” The fact remains, however, that the exclusion of Fiume from the nation, thus making it a competing foreign port, would deeply affect the economic life of Trieste.

For what concerns the defense of Italy, Istria offers the military port of Pola. It is absurd, however, to believe, as some would insinuate, that Pola solves the military problems of the Adriatic. Only those who are ignorant of both ancient and modern history can make such an assertion. Venice founded the fortress of Pola, not to maintain her dominion of the sea, but to protect the outlet of the Quarnaro from the Imperials and from the Uscocchi. After 1848 Austria fortified Pola, not to dominate the Adriatic, but to defend Trieste and Venice. In the conception of Austrian military circles of recent times, Pola was the great base for the navy and the defensive port for Trieste and Fiume. Pola was never considered as the key to the domination of the Adriatic. For this purpose Austria fortified Cattaro and Sebenico. When Napoleon was advised to fortify Pola in order to hold the Adriatic he denied its importance. The well-known Austrian military expert, Rziha, studying, in 1908, the defense of the Adriatic domination, entrusted it to Dalmatia. The Frenchman Touchard, in

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1912, wrote these significant words: “Pola is too far from the entrance of the Adriatic to be its mistress.” The possession of Venezia Giulia, therefore, while it represents a powerful land defense, does not at all solve the Adriatic problem. It gives us a military harbor which will always be the great naval base and will form part of the defense of Venice. Its importance, however, will be only defensive for the upper Adriatic, for Venice, for Trieste and for Fiume.

Fiume

The Treaty of London does not sanction the final completion of national unity. It exacts from Italy a grave sacrifice, that of Fiume. No one can express the sorrow which the people of Fiume have felt upon observing that the Italian press accepted such a sacrifice without a protest, without a word of regret. The Treaty assigns Fiume to Croatia. This is a flagrant and profound violation of the principle of nationality. Suffice it to recall that Fiume has struggled against Croatia for more than a century, with frequent manifestations of high moral courage. And it is still struggling. Taken by the Croatians with treachery and violence after 1848, Fiume did not cease to protest until she was liberated from the Croatians in 1867. Fiume always refused with admirable and powerful popular unity any sort of connection with Croatia.

The Treaty of London, contrary to the wishes of the Italian Government, excluded Fiume from the unification of Italy. No one need to be surprised that after its publication there were demonstrations in favor of the Magyars in the city. They are natural even if they are painful, even if for the present they give comfort to the enemy. They are natural because the publication of the Treaty must have wrung the hearts of patriots. They are natural because of its own free will Fiume would sooner go to the devil than become Croatian. One must have lived there, on the borders of Italy, one must have suffered and fought, worshipping the name of Italy, have imposed upon himself infinite sacrifices for the good of Italy, have felt the oppression of Croatian hatred, have inherited a splendid national tradition, have cherished a passionate faith in liberty and in Italy, to understand what it must mean to a patriot of Fiume to see his city abandoned by his Italian brothers without an expression of regret and protest.

The Treaty determines the Italian border toward Fiume on the line which is today the administrative boundary of Istria. Since it was only in 1776 that Fiume was taken from Istria, to which the city
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had always belonged, the confines of Istria have remained hardly 2000 meters from Fiume, in a locality called Cantrida. It is impossible to establish the border of Italy on such a line. One must consider that the torpedo factory, the shipyard and other industries of Fiume extend as far as Cantrida. At Cantrida were the public baths connected to Fiume by the street railways. Many of the people of Fiume were in the habit of going by trolley to Cantrida to get the Austrian cigarettes that are better than the Hungarian. The Italian boundary, coming up to Cantrida would be really at the city limits; it would indeed be within the sphere of the city proper. Is it possible to put such a project into practice, and is it possible for Italy to extend within a pistolshot of the factories of Fiume and there renounce its national rights and abandon the city?

The commercial spirit of certain demagogues, ready for any compromises in favor of our adversaries and at the expense of our rights, propose that Fiume be made a free city. And they do not comprehend—because they ignore all the facts of our national struggle, that this would make Fiume a hotbed of antagonisms, so near to both the Italian and Slavic borders, where the interests and the passions of the two nations would clash. These passions, under an autonomous regime, not controlled by any superior authority, would flare up into all kinds of violence. Where justice and peace might be established a desire appears to light a conflagration of municipal and racial disorder, mediaeval in its character.

THE QUARNARO.—The islands of the Quarnaro belong to Dalmatia, although it was only in 1848 that Lussino asked to be reunited to Dalmatia. The East Coast of the Quarnaro is assigned to Croatia. Between the coast and the islands there has not been for at least eleven centuries any political union; nor, until the modern Slavic geographies appeared, were the Islands of the Quarnaro considered in any way geographically united to Croatia. The islands of the Quarnaro form a body politic which has a closeknit integrity, moulded by thousands of years of history and Dalmatian unity. All this, let us repeat according to historic tradition, is also confirmed in the field of geographical knowledge. It is worth while to remember, however, that Taramelli maintained, as early as 1878, that the islands of Quarnaro belong geologically to Italy. Inverardi also, recently, establishing the natural boundary of Italy at the promontory of Dubno, beyond Buccari, included in the country the islands of Veglia and of Cherso-Lussin. Speaking of these islands let us bear in mind that Bartoli spoke of Istrian Dalmatia, taking account of the historic tradition and the
national consciousness developed in the Italians of the Quarnaro after a century of unity with Istria.

The Treaty of London, sanctioning the arbitrary ruling of Austria and going even farther, breaks up this union into three fragments. When Austria divided what had been harmoniously united, by history and geography, she saved certain national and historical appearances, leaving Arbe and Pago to Dalmatia and uniting Veglia, Cherso and Lussino to Istria, that is to say to Italy. The Treaty of London, instead, assigns Lussino and Cherso to Istria, Pago to Dalmatia, and abandons Veglia and Arbe to Croatia. It is confusion introduced where there is order.

The island of Cherso and that of Lussino, which are really a single island separated by an artificial canal, would therefore remain to Italy, also the little islands that girdle them.

Cherso was well looked after by the Italians of its chief city, which gave Italy Farneseco Patrizio, the sixteenth century philosopher, and Moisè, a famous Italian grammarian. On the island of Mussino is the excellent military port called the valley of Augustus. Lussin the smaller, Lussin the greater and Neresine, the three principal seats of Italianism, were centers so influential that they attracted into the orbit of our nation a great part of the Slavs which occupied the villages.

The concessions made in favor of the Croatians in the Treaty of London are made at the expense of Dalmatia. They represent limitations of Italian rights in Dalmatia. To Croatia would be assigned: (a) Beside the islets of San Giorgio and of Cali, the island of Arbe. The city of Arbe, which has a limpidly Italian name, has kept, even among the Slavic elements, the dominant love for the Italian tongue, notwithstanding fifty years of Austrian violence. When the Croatian school was opened there, no pupils were to be found; when pupils were forced to attend, the teachers and scholars could not understand each other. It became necessary to import boys from the country to keep the school alive and humiliate the Italians. But the Italian language was victorious. At Arbe, which is a marvellous museum of Italian art, there are, as Tommaseo stated, more Croatian sympathizers than Croatians. But there are also admirable and devoted Italians worthy of our affection and of our liberty. Arbe gave to Italy one of the greatest geniuses of the seventeenth century, the bishop De Dominis, discoverer of the modern theory of the solar spectrum, upholder of the independence of church and state, opponent of the temporal power of
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the Pope, martyr of free thought, whose body was burned at the Campo di Fiori at Florence.

THE CROATIAN COAST.—As we have already stated, the Treaty of London assigns Fiume to Croatia. For an Italian of the Adriatic it is torture even to record this fact. The published text says that to Croatia will be granted "the little ports of Novi and Carlo­pago." Here the alteration of the Treaty by the Bolshevist editors is very evident. For much more than the two small harbors to the lot of Croatia would fall, viz:

(a) The bay of Buccari, with the ports of Buccari and Portorè, a bay so important that Napoleon, considering it capable of being converted into a great naval base for the Adriatic, had begun the necessary improvements.
(b) The port of Novi.
(c) The port of Cirquenizza, important for its coast trading.
(d) The port of Segna, largest of all, the historic port of Croatia, its real, natural outlet, much used in all periods of history.
(e) The port of San Giorgio.
(f) The port of Jablanac or Ablana.
(g) The port of Carlo­pago.

To measure the importance of these ports in respect to the modest needs of Croatia, it must be taken into account that less than ten per cent. of the maritime commerce of Fiume belongs to the Croatian hinterland. All of this little percentage could be turned into Segna, joining it to the railway which passes through Ogulin. This Croatian center is about fifty kilometers nearer to the sea at Segna than at Fiume. It must not be forgotten that the bay of Buccari is in itself a magnificent harbor. Very little construction work and a short branch of the railroad would suffice to make it a splendid outlet for Croatia.

In regard to the military value of the concessions made to the Croatians, it is worth while remembering that they should have the entire disposition of the inlet to Buccari and of all the strait of Morlacca.

Just as both of these were for more than fifty years shelters for the Oscocchi, against whose swift little ships the enormous naval su-
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The Treaty of London speaks of a Croatian state to which would be made the assignments cited above. Does it refer to a federative Croatian state united to the others of Austria-Hungary (as the Croats themselves wish) or to an independent Croatian state? The Treaty at this point, in the published edition, is quite the reverse of exact. Even if no mention is made of the dismemberment of Austria, it is absurd to say, as some do, that the Treaty is not conceived with special consideration to the problems of the southern Slavs.

On the contrary, the interests of the southern Slavs are constantly protected with such generosity, with such lordly prodigality, with such motherly care, that it is easy to see from whence come the limitations to which the reunification of Italy has been subjected. After all, notwithstanding the impression of the text, it seems evident to us, given the well-known tendencies of Russia and Italy, that there was a wish to create a Croatia independent of Servia and Austria. In April, 1915, Italy, not yet weary of herself, less infatuated by the empty flattery of ideas not her own, and nearer to the historic and actual truth, more practically devoted to her own interests and to that of her future and of the general peace did not desire the formation of the Jugo-Slav state. She did not want to put the Serbs in subjection to the better organized and more powerful Croatians. Nor did Italy wish, to her own disadvantage, to secure to the Southern Slavs, with the formation of that state, absolute supremacy in the Balkan peninsula. Italy was, nevertheless, most favorable, as she has always been, to the independence of all Slavs. In this sense, therefore, the reference to Croatia in the Treaty must be interpreted.

Dalmatia.—Paragraph 5 of the Treaty dividing Dalmatia into two sections, assigns the northern part to Italy within these limits: "Italy will receive the province of Dalmatia in its present extent, including moreover to the north Lassarissa and Trebinje, and to the South all the territory to a line leaving the sea near Punta Planca (between Trau and Sebenico) and following the watershed East in such a way as to place in Italian territory all the valleys whose waters flow into the sea near Sebenico, that is, Ciccola, Cherca and Busti-
Map of Italy and the Redeemed Lands

Italian Territory before the war is the portion indicated by dots. The solid black regions are those promised to Italy by the Treaty of London, of April 1915. Under that treaty Italy’s boundary in the North and in the East would follow the dashed line.
ITALY
as she would be under the terms of the Treaty of London.
Occupied Territory

The districts of Fiume and Valona, occupied by the Italians, are indicated by squares.
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gnizza with their affluents. To Italy will also belong the islands to the North and West of the Dalmatian coast, beginning from Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Scherda, Maon, Pago and Puntadura on the North, and reaching to Meleda on the South, with the addition of the islands of St. Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Torcola, Curzola, Cazza, Lagosta and all the surrounding islets and rocks, and, therefore, also Pelagosa, but without the islands of Greater and Smaller Zirona, Bua, Solta and Brazza.” The proposed division for Dalmatia has only a single historic precedent in darkest antiquity, when the basin of the Cherca formed the confine between the Liburnians and the Dalmatians.

What criterion was followed for the division proposed in 1915? There was a wish to secure to Italy at least Zara, heart and marvel of Italianism, and Sebenico, a powerful military base no less formidable than Cattaro and much more important than Pola. The necessity of making a compromise kept Italy from making Dalmatia count as a single historic body, as an entity harmoniously formed of parts each having its particular function to perform. Therefore, the province of Spalato remains separated from the portions assigned to Italy, Spalato, which is the vital organ of Dalmatian economy, the sole foundation of Dalmatian importance in Adriatic and Oriental commerce, and which contains, moreover, the finest and most heroic Italian minority of Dalmatia besides the grandest and most marvelous testimonials of its twenty centuries of latinity.

The error of the Treaty of London in regard to Dalmatia is to have reduced to a mere strategic problem that which is primarily a great national political problem. As in the question of Alsace-Lorraine the vast strategic problem is subordinate to the question of historic and national right, so it should justly be also in the case of Dalmatia. Even above the questions which are to be entrusted to the naval general staff, there exist unselfish and impelling issues of humanity, of nationality, and of Italianism, which must be weighed in the hearts of the Italian people and solved by statesmen with wisdom, faith and conscience regarding all human rights. First, the national rights, first the decision whether Italian civilization on the Eastern Adriatic shall advance or recede; then the military problems. But even as regards the solution of military necessities the Treaty of London is merely temporary. For the supreme interest of Italy is not to defend herself from a menace coming from the East coast of the Adriatic, but to prevent such a menace from taking form. The supreme interest of Italy is to be able to close the Adriatic between Valona and Brindisi entirely immune from menace. The ultimate purpose, historically in-
eluctable, is not the construction of fortresses at Pola, at Sebenico and on the Islands, but the destruction of such fortresses, the creation of a situation which renders them useless. Therefore, it is not the foundation of a military supremacy, but the elimination of every possible hostility, and the establishment of our civilization. That would signify the transformation of the Adriatic into a lake in which commerce can flourish peacefully, busy and continuous, even if war breaks out in other places. Was it possible to grant such necessity in the Treaty of London? Or is it not more likely that between nothing and all it chose a middle course? In 1915 the anti-historical and fantastic principle of war upon war did not prevail. Today it does. Whoever wishes to achieve this end, should become apostle of an Adriatic program conforming to the supreme interests of Italy, because any one who knows geography, history and the laws that draw the people to the Adriatic, knows with intimate conviction that until the Adriatic problem is entirely solved with the exclusion of any naval danger from outside, Italy will have a difficult situation to face in the Adriatic at every complication that may arise in Europe, and Italy will inevitably side with the one that will help settle it. It will be a dead weight tied to our policy. It is an inexorable law based on the geography of the sea and on the convergence on it of the dynamic force of many races. It is necessary to consider the situation in its sad reality. But it is useless to pretend that the Treaty of London would correspond exactly to it. It is wise, however, to observe that while the Slavs, the Magyars and the Germans claim and sustain before the world their maximum program of Adriatic expansion, only the Italians, timidly, beg for themselves a few sentimental rights. And no one has stronger rights than ours.

THE PORTION ASSIGNED TO ITALY.—In the delineation of the confines of the parts divided from Dalmatia, there is uncertainty in the Bolshevik edition of the Treaty of London. The imaginary line running from Punta Planca toward the interior should separate the basin of the Cherca from that of the Cetina. It is not stated at what height it must enter the basin of the Cicola. The first section of the boundary could not be supported by important physiogeographical features. It would run thru a uniform terrain, according to the caprice or the ability of the delineator. Probably an existing boundary was also taken into consideration, the one between the political districts of Sebenico and Tanin (Knin) on one hand and Spalato and Signa on the other.

The frontier recognized as the just one for Italy, from Punta Planca would run toward Ragosnizza, where it would be grafted on to
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the present boundary between the districts of Spalato and Sebenico. It would intersect the Traù-Sebenico railroad between Boraia and Lepenizza or the Spalato-Sebenico railroad between Dolazza and Pri-soie. Near Sitno it would have to abandon this politico-administrative boundary, because it winds tortuously around the railroad just where the junction of Percovitch occurs, where the line branches off that goes up to Dernis and Tanin which have been allotted to Italy. The junction, however, should be included within the Italian frontier. This would follow the present political boundaries already quoted as far as Mount Kichin (805 meters), where it would touch the summit of the Cicola valley. From there, following the crest of the Mosseg mountains (the watershed), it would reach Mount Radini (743 meters) or Mount Lasaz (768 meters), the boundary between the districts of Signa and Spalato. This follows the watershed. The Italian frontier should traverse the mass of Mount Visocca (891 meters), that of Mount Plaisieviza (994 meters), run along the crest of the Sfila (1509 meters), touch Mount Sauro (1309 meters) and join the Dinaric Alps at Mount Dinara (1831 meters).

The Sfila and the mighty impassable masses of the Dinaric Alps would be a boundary founded on secure elements. The northern confines would be Mount Santo of the Velebits: "A natural frontier difficult to penetrate," as Reclus said.

The indication of the Treaty is incomprehensible relative to the location of Lissarizza and of Trebigne or Tribani, because, in starting the present boundary of Dalmatia at Val Maddalena, the few houses of Lissarizza, as well as those of Tribani, are included in it.

The Treaty recognizes Italy's right to two important centers on the coast:

(a) Zara, and our hearts are filled with joy to see consecrated by an international compact the rights which the city itself has honored.

(b) Sebenico, perhaps the strongest military harbor of eastern Adriatic, capable, as Robin said, of holding the fleet of the whole world; the best base in all the Adriatic for an offensive squadron, according to Rziha. Sebenico, although largely inhabited by Croatians, has strong Italian elements. If we were arguing for an archaeological museum, we would call attention to the monuments. But we are arguing for every-day life. And there is much besides

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churches and palaces at Sebenico. Whoever enters the harbor beholds a greater spectacle than the marvelous cathedral; that of the imposing factories of the Suffi Company, a triumphant Italian industry, and on the waterfront the monument to Tommaseo speaks more eloquent truth than a hundred books. To give an idea of the national situation at Sebenico, let me quote what was published in November, 1911, in the Napredniak, the Croatian organ of the city: "We have Italian as our mother-tongue; the mothers and wives and children of all of us speak Italian, but it is our patriotic duty to fight it, to obliterate it."

The other lands to which Italy is given the right of possession are:

(c) The region of the river Zermagna, with the village of Obrovazzo.

(d) The Valley of the Cherca, with its waterfalls in part exploited by Italian industry; the valleys of the Cicola and of the Butizin ("utisnica"), with the villages of Scardona and Dernis, with the coal mines of Promina and of the village of Tanin (Knin).

(e) The region between Zara and the Dinaric Alps, the so-called region of the Faggi (Bucoviza) and the Montano, regions nearly deserted (27 inhabitants per two square kilometers).

(f) The islands of the Archipelago of Zara and Sebenico.

(g) The outer islands of the archipelagos of Spalato and of Ragusa, of which the most important are: (1) Lissa, (2) Lesina, very fertile islands in which the Italian language is most triumphantly dominant; (3) Curzola, fertile and rich in harbors. Lagosta, Busi, St. Andrea, Cazza, and Torcola are islands of no importance.

As for Lissa, to-day we realize finally that her fortifications belong to archaeology and that her strategic position, as the French admiral, Bouet-Willeumez, recognized in 1868, has no importance.

MORE THAN FIVE HUNDRED KILOMETERS OF COAST AND ALL THE OUTLETS OF THE BALKANIC HINTERLAND TO THE SLAVS. A general examination of the territory assigned by the Treaty of London to the Jugo-Slavs gives an idea of the excessive generosity with which the Treaty has safeguarded their interests. No nation has ever given a better example of moderation than Italy has in the Treaty of London. No nation has ever been more keenly concerned in the welfare of another state, and we should like to per-
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receive as much altruism in the policy of those nations whence the criticism of our selfishness originates.

The Treaty of London, summing up the length of the coast from Cantrida to Val Maddalena and from Punta Planca to Durazzo, assigns to the Slavs, with the consent of Italy, nearly 700 kilometers of coast in direct line without taking account of the inlets and of the gulfs which alone determine the military importance of the concessions made to the Slavs. The total length of the Dalmatian coast from Val Maddalena to Spizza, with all the sinuosities, according to Sobieczky, is 2304 kilometers. Of these less than one-third were assigned to Italy, while the rest would belong to the Slavs with the addition of more than three hundred kilometers in the Quarnaro and in Albania.

After calculating the extent of coast given to the Slavs, we should deduct the measure of military effort required in case of war for surveillance and defense. It will be evident, then that with the Treaty of London the military problem of the Adriatic is modified, is receded, is shifted, but it is not solved. With the application of the Treaty of London, the strategic situation of Italy would undergo a complete change: she would become dominant where she is dominated, but the naval problem of the Adriatic would remain unsolved.

But there is more. While Italy's right to a single commercially and economically valuable seaport is recognized, to the Slavs is conceded the possession of at least eight ports economically important as outlets of vast hinterlands; in other words, the possession of all the commercial ports of the eastern Adriatic, with the exception of Trieste. These ports are: Fiume, Spalato, Metcovitch, Cattaro, Ragusa, Antivari, Dulcigno, S. Giovanni di Medua. One may add Segna and also probably Durazzo. Trieste is not a port whose sphere of action extends particularly to the western Balkans. The ports of Istria, and Zara and Sebenico economically have merely a local importance. Zara and Sebenico are not in a position to withstand competition from Spalato. Instead, the ports mentioned above are all at the ends of roads of penetration and are all natural and necessary outlets for vast Balkan territories. The concessions made to the Slavs are, therefore, enormous, all out of proportion to those made to Italy. To the latter all the harbors which afford entry to the Balkans are denied.
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Excluding Italy from all of them, a real and serious economic preponderance is created in favor of the Slavs. To Italy, instead of the certainty of commercial development, only the necessity for competition is left, a competition in which Italy’s chance to be at an advantage or at a disadvantage will be dependent on international political conditions outside her control. Add to these the fact that a creation of a Jugo-Slav state would secure to the Southern Slavs the incontestable political supremacy in the Balkans. Their absolute economic preponderance would be for this reason, besides being an effect of their domination of all the Adriatic outlets, a natural function of their hegemony. In consequence, if one of the fundamental points of the Treaty of London, that concerning the creation of several Slavic states, were changed, Italy would not be defended by that Treaty either against the political supremacy nor against the economic prevalence of the Southern Slavs in the Balkans. They would hold the key of all the Balkan economic territory and could shut it up at their pleasure, according to the vicissitudes of their politics, habitually impulsive, disorderly and imperialistic. The fact of Balkan states being, like Italy, primarily agricultural, makes it even harder for them to withstand the Austro-German competition founded on exchanges most natural between an agricultural and an industrial people. The harbors which would be Italy’s only powerful weapons to combat this competition are denied her even though she boasts splendid historic and natural rights to them.

What has been said above is enough to make it clear what strong Slavic interests, meticulously defended, have limited those of Italy. And to grasp the vastness of the benefits assured the Southern Slavs on the sea, it is here recalled that in 1909, Cvićije, in a semi-official Serbian pamphlet, considered a coast of only five kilometers between Ragusa and Cattaro sufficient for the economic independence of Serbia. This same Cvićije, who, as is well known, is an eminent geographer, declared that the Dalmatian ports were out of the sphere of Serbia and its natural outlet was the coast between Antivari and Durazzo.

DALMATIA ASSIGNED TO THE SLAVS.—The part of Dalmatia assigned to the Slavs comprises all the province from Cape Planca to the south, and adds to it beyond Cattaro and Spizza that part of Albania which was called in former times Dalmatia Prevalitana. According to the text and spirit of the Treaty, when it mentions the Slavs in this part of the Adriatic, it means either the Serbs or the Montenegrins.

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The Treaty of London concedes to the Slavs the right to:

(a) The city of Traù, where Dalmatian-Italian art is triumphant as is the Italian tongue, notwithstanding more than fifty years of denationalization, for here the pseudo-Croatians, all speaking Italian, go by the names of Rossignoli, Sentinella, Palladino, Madirazza, Cindro, Garibaldi, etc.

(b) Spalato, the highest expression of Dalmatian Italianism radiating through all its life, home of Antonio Baiamonti, defended with incredible sacrifice by its Italian minority, so Italian and so cruelly oppressed by the Croatians that the very sight of it drew tears from the skeptical Marquis Di San Giuliano. Spalato is the largest port of central Adriatic, capable of becoming the greatest economic and political outlet of the Balkans upon the Adriatic, surely destined to be the terminal of the Danube-Adriatic Railroad.

(c) The port of Almissa.

(d) Cetara, like the foregoing, a port of remarkable local importance.

(e) Metcovic, a river port on the Narenta; of great importance as a natural outlet of Herzegovina.

(f) Klek (Clesto), a bay for which the Austrian governor had already prepared a project which, including a canal through the isthmus of Stagno, would have made a port subsidiary to but more important than Metcovic.

(g) Ragusa, whose importance is established by centuries of history, and whose dual nationality to-day is attested by the fact that it had an Italian governor as late as 1900, and in 1910, notwithstanding all repressive measures, its twenty per cent. of Italian population was still patriotically organized.

(h) Cattaro, the outlet for Montenegro, seat of a strong naval base, which, together with Lovcen, would remain in the hands of the Southern Slavs; a city which only lost her Italian Podesta (Governor) in 1900, and in 1914 still has its street signs marked in both Italian and Slavic.

(i) The district of Bocehe di Cattaro and that of Spizza.

(l) The district of Signo and Verlicca, with all the fertile

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valley of the Cetina, whose waterfalls have already been exploited by Italian industries.

(m) The district of Bergoraz, rich in minerals.

(n) The district of Imota, the granary of Dalmatia.

(o) The region of Narenta, arid and swampy, but important for its roads.

(p) The small Zitone islands and the islands of Bua and Solta.

(q) The island of Brazza, the most fertile and richest of all the Dalmatian islands, harboring the commune of Neresi, which was the next to the last of all the Dalmatian islands to fall into the hands of the Croatians.

(r) Dalmatia Prevalitana, or Northern Albania, with the important ports of Dulcigno and S. Giovanni di Medua. The treaty is not explicit about the lot of Durazzo. The bay of Antivari naturally remains to the Slavs. How this last zone is to be divided between the Montenegrins and Serbs is not stated. Probably the coast between Point Molonta and the mouth of the Boiana, including the Bocche di Cattaro, would be intended for Montenegro.

The Treaty does not provide any guarantee for the Italians left to the mercy of the Croatians. It may be that this is left to a supplementary treaty dealing with details. This is quite probable. But we, knowing the situation sufficiently well, can say that the Treaty of London is in this regard realistic. Where the struggle of race and nationality has raged for years and is inevitable, the only possible guarantee of nationality lies in the spirit of those who suffer and struggle, that is in the determination to resist. All the laws, all the paragraphs of treaties, in an historic and immutable field of battle between two races, are merest baubles. Who would dream of asking Germany in a treaty to look after the interest of the French in Lorraine? Who would dare impose on France, by treaty, the conservation of the nationality of the German peoples in Alsace? Dalmatia and Alsace are the two classic grounds where two great races conflict.
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The people in them who do not fight, die. No paragraph of a treaty can save them. Only those who have no knowledge of conflicts of race and nationality can believe the contrary.

In Dalmatia the situation is even more complicated. If the provisions of a treaty obliging the Croatians to leave in peace the Italians under their dominion were obeyed, the latter would expand enormously through the inner vigor they possess; it would then become a necessity for the Slavs to combat them, to free themselves from the danger of being absorbed by the Italians. The defense of their natural expansion, which the Italians would make, would give the Slavs a pretext for attacking them. And what would Italy do? Declare a new war? Only those who, like Salvemini, revel in their own ignorance, believing that the national struggles of Austria are a game played for prestige by the Viennese government or a municipal pastime, can delude themselves into thinking that the Italian minorities can be saved with paragraphs of law or written documents. Abandoned beyond the frontier, the minorities would have no source of life except within themselves, other than their sharp and spirited resistance to Croatian absorption.

They might receive a strong support from the intensified immigration of Italians from Italy. But every increase in the number and economic force of the Italians would be at the same time an intensification of the national struggle. This is predestined and inevitable. It is absurd to expect that the provisions of a treaty can regulate these events or protect outright the expansion of the Italian element where this expansion would be feared and hated and fought by natural forces. Indeed, the existence of a treaty of this sort might create dangerous obligations on the part of Italy to intervene against the Croatians. This is not politics; it is pure social geography.

NEUTRALIZATION.—The Treaty of London stipulates and obliges the neutralization of all the coast given to the Southern Slavs, except the tract between the peninsula of Sabbioncello, which is excluded, and a point south of Ragusa, which is probably Punta Patkio or Punta Molonta.

These neutralizations, as anyone who is not blind to history knows very well, are only provisional and temporary remedies. In the
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Treaty of Campoformio and in that of Luneville, Napoleon imposed on Austria the neutralization of the Adriatic. This did not prevent Austria, only sixty years later, from becoming a victorious maritime power on the Adriatic.

As to the present situation we have some characteristic affirmations. Paic has said that Italy has nothing to fear in the Adriatic because the Slavs will have no navy for some time. And after that time has elapsed, what?

A certain Jugo-Slav leader was surprised that Italy was preoccupied with the strategic problem in the Adriatic since for at least a generation it would be impossible for the Jugo-Slavs to build themselves ships. And after that generation, what?

In the meantime let us bear in mind that in 1915 Serbia had already acquired a torpedo boat; the Serbian government denied it, but when the torpedo boat was launched at Bordeaux a photograph of it appeared in the "Petite Gironde." We also recall another interesting photograph of March, 1917, "Admiral Townbridge passes in review the Serbian sailors in training at Salonika." Marines for the Lake of Ocrida? Sailors trained today for the fleet whose construction will not take place for at least another generation?

It is indeed possible that the Slavs will not have ships but will have ports. Touchard, in 1912, upholding the expediency of giving Vallona to the Slavs, wrote that it would make possible "la jonction des flotte franco-russes" in the Adriatic. Or is there no ground to fear for the future a "jonction" likewise elegantly thought out for other Slavic ports? Moreover, who will destroy all the great fortifications at Cattaro? To whom will the enormous quantity of material go?

There are left to the Slavs many ports capable of attaining military importance:

(a) That of Traù, the usual station for the Austrian fleet.

(b) That of Spalato, very large and deep, perfectly defended by the islands of Bua and Solta, already under consideration by the
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Austrian naval authorities.

(c) The Strait of Brazza.

(d) The many harbors of the island of Brazza, admirable hiding places for submarines.

(e) The bay of Cattaro with Loveen.

(f) The Strait of Calamotta.

The latter lies exactly in the zone not to be neutralized. And even today, during the war, it is an important Austrian naval base. It is true, in fact, that Napoleon wanted to make this same strait of Calamotta the principal naval port of the Adriatic, and had already drawn up the plans and begun the construction of storehouses. Let us note that also the port of Buccari, the other harbor of which Napoleon wished to make important military use, is in the unneutralized zone of the Quarnaro.

Is it possible to believe that a people which commands so many hundreds of kilometers of coast, animated by such imperialistic tendencies as the southern Slavs, endowed with harbors and sailors and a natural, well-proven, warlike instinct, will remain without maritime ambition? Is it possible that they will not feel neutralization as a heavy yoke, and that they will not tend to cast it off and prepare their ports for military use, in readiness for the moment of a European complication?

More than 1500 kilometers of coast, harbors, sailors, sympathizers in Europe, the spirit of adventure, these are elements which combine to produce a powerful explosive. There are restraints imposed by external nature to which the human will cannot submit. Is it possible to have hundreds and hundreds of kilometers of coast and yet to cherish no naval ambitions?

RUSSIA AND THE TREATY OF LONDON.—We have tried to illustrate the Treaty of London very objectively, free from all prejudice, from every theoretical vice, from every obsession to sys-
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tematize, with thoughts only for the interests of Italy and the interests of European peace.

We have enumerated the great and exceptional advantages which the Treaty of London has reserved to the southern Slavs, the grave amputations and painful renunciations that it has imposed upon Italy, together with inestimable advantages which, after their realization has been accomplished by the war, will bear a beneficial influence on the destiny of the nation for centuries to come.

No renunciation has been asked of the Jugo-Slavs that may be compared in moral importance to that which Italy is called upon to make regarding Fiume and Spalato. Fiume is an indisputably Italian city. No one can assert that any part of Dalmatia assigned either to Italy or to the Jugo-Slavs is Slavic to the same degree and one should bear in mind that Spalato belonged to the Latins and to the Italians for over 2000 years, while the Croatians have possessed this city for only 35 years.

The renunciations made by Italy in favor of the Slavs alter and leave unsolved the problem of the Adriatic. No renunciation has been imposed upon the Jugo-Slavs which may keep unsettled the fundamental problem of their liberation or their autonomy. We have been given right of possession only to one economically important port in the eastern Adriatic, while the Jugo-Slavs would possess all the important outlets of the eastern Adriatic. Which side may be accused of imperialism?

The precious and vast advantages assigned to the Jugo-Slavs by the Treaty of London betrays the truly motherly hand of Russia who determined them.

One often hears it said: "Now that Russia has crumbled and there is no more danger that Jugo-Slavia will become a 'manus longa' of the Russian nation in the Adriatic, we may cede a part of what we have secured from the Allies with the treaty of 1915, on account of the Russian menace." The base for such assertion is absolutely erroneous. The settlement of the Adriatic outlined in the Treaty of London is not directed against a pan-Slavic menace, but it has been
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limited, or more exactly, has been determined by the will of Russia. No one, therefore, has any reason to criticize the Italian government. On the contrary, everybody knows how firmly Russia opposed any settlement proposed for Europe and Asia, and how many deviations, renunciations and painful concessions she imposed upon France and England. Any criticism in this regard would be unjust and useless. It is necessary, however, to know the real genesis of the Treaty of London in relation to the Adriatic, which is simply this: The Italian national rights in the Adriatic were not considered then, nor defined in the light of the Pan-Slavic menace. But, as a matter of fact, they were curtailed only to satisfy Pan-Slavic ambitions dictated by Imperial Russia. The Treaty of London does not carry out the political plan outlined by Italy, because it was substantially changed and subjected to the limitations demanded by Russia. There was no government in Europe that did not feel the weight of Russian influence in April, 1915. In vain did Marquis Carlotti demonstrate Italy's rights to Spalato.

In consideration of all these facts, the Treaty of London should represent merely a starting point or a "minimum" of the Italian rights in the Adriatic. Certain political tendencies of today, suffering, after the Italian disaster of Caporetto, from a depression which the nation as a whole has not felt, are willing to regard the contents of the Treaty as the "maximum" of Italy's rights. Italy is passing thru a dark hour. When the truth will be known regarding the Jugo-Slavs and Austria; when the immense political value of the Italian resistance at the Piave will be appreciated; when new battles will have imposed upon Italy far heavier sacrifices, and a military contribution infinitely superior to that calculated in April, 1915; only then it may be estimated how valuable and sacred Italy is and how she should be protected against any eventuality, even against the possible change of attitude of those nations that today profess to be her friends.

The gratitude of a people is more evanescent than the clouds. What gratitude do the Jugo-Slavs show towards Italy for the inestimable benefits that she wrought for Serbia from 1912 to 1916? None. On the contrary, in their newspapers published in the United States, they accuse the Italians of having incited the Albanians against them. The blood that Victory will have exacted from Italy will make the Italians
more jealous of their rights. Ricasoli once said that Italy has no lands to restore, but lands to redeem.

Then, the Treaty of London will be the starting point, precisely what it should be for a strong nation conscious of its mission, of its importance, of its rights. Italy will direct all her energy to the establishment of that Latin peace in the Adriatic which will not signify military dominion, but the unrestrained expansion of civilization, which is the only true guarantee of her safety and greatness, and the necessary fundamental condition for European peace. And in the establishment of the supremacy of civilization Italy will be firm and inflexible in her right, "car"—Edgar Quinet said—"pour porter hout le drapeau de la civilisation moderne, il faut un peuple qui loin de chan­celer à chaque pas soit au contraire appuye sur des bases inexpug­nables."